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 
Abstract — This paper is a study of price stabilization in the 
staple food distribution system. All stakeholders experience 
market risks due to some possibility causes of price volatility. 
Many models of price stabilization had been developed by 
employing several approaches such as floor-ceiling prices, 
buffer funds, export or import taxes, and subsidies. In the 
previous researches, the models were expanded to increase the 
purchasing price for producer and decrease the selling price 
for consumer. Therefore, the policy can influence the losses for 
non-speculative wholesaler that is reflected by the descending 
of selling quantity and ascending of the stocks. The objective of 
this model is not only to keep the expectation of both producer 
and consumer, but also to protect non-speculative wholesaler 
from the undesirable result of the stabilization policy. A 
nonlinear programming model was addressed to determine the 
instruments of intervention program. Moreover, the result 
shows that the wholesaler behavior affects the intervention 
costs. 
 
Index Terms Buffer stocks, Price stabilization, Nonlinear 
programming, Wholesaler behavior. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The price volatility of commodity has been greatly became a 
problem in the staple food distribution system. The shortage of 
staple food around the world has been affecting the economics, 
political and social crisis because of food security reason [1]-[3]. 
Price stabilization policy is an intervention in the market in order to 
reduce price volatility. The international organization and domestic 
governments have tried numerous ways to stabilize price for 
example by implementing the quota systems, commodity 
agreements, marketing boards, compensatory funds, and price 
hedging on futures markets [4]-[9]. However, it is only a small 
number of these mechanisms have entirely succeeded [10]-[15]. 
This situation forced the domestic governments to stabilize the 
prices by using appropriate local solutions.  
 
  
 
W. Sutopo  
Ph. D. Student of Industrial Engineering and  Management,  
Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung 40132, INDONESIA, and 
Faculty member of Industrial Engineering Department,  
Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta 57126, INDONESIA 
E-mail: wahyudisutopo@students.itb.ac.id.  and sutopo@uns.ac.id.  
 ) correspondence author for submitting paper to the 2010 ICMEEM  
S.  Nur Bahagia,  A. Cakravastia, T. M. A. A.  Samadhi 
Faculty member of  Industrial Engineering Department,  
Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung 40132, INDONESIA 
E-mail: 
S.  Nur Bahagia   : senator@mail.ti.itb.ac.id. 
A. Cakravastia    : andi@mail.ti.itb.ac.id. 
T. M. A. A.  Samadhi : asamadhi@mail.ti.itb.ac.id. 
 In the last few years, there were many models of price 
stabilization developed by each country using several approaches 
such as floor-ceiling prices [16], [17], buffer funds [18]-[22], export 
or import taxes [23]-[25], and subsidies [26]-[28]. In the developing 
countries, it is common that governments stabilize the price using 
both export/import taxes and subsidies approaches. However, these 
create a policy dilemma since these countries signed the general 
agreement on trade and tariff (GATT). They must reduce the 
quantitative restrictions and tariffs. On the other hand, if the 
governments use State Trading Enterprises (STEs) to stabilize price 
using both floor-ceiling prices and buffer funds, it might be still 
allowed [10], [11]. Therefore, this study only focuses on how to 
develop a model based on the floor-ceiling prices and the buffer 
funds.  
 There were a number of researches had been conducted 
regarding to this issue. It came out with several models. The 
reduction of uncertainty on the supply side only by determining the 
buffer stocks schemes consist of time and amount of buffer’s 
procurement were proposed by [29], [30]. The reduction of 
uncertainty on the supply side by deciding the buffer stocks schemes 
consist of the amount and price of procurement were developed by 
[31]-[37]. The reduction of uncertainty on the demand side by 
determining the buffer stocks schemes consist of the amount and 
price of procurement were addressed by [18]-[23], [26].  
 This research is trying to fill the research gaps. Meanwhile, it 
also comes up with the real problem of sugar price stabilization in 
the supply chain of sugar in Indonesia. The sugar price volatility 
was carried for some reasons as follow. First, based on 
supply-demand problem, the domestic supply is decreasing contrary 
to the increasing of the staple food consumption [38], [39]. Second, 
due to the periods of sugar cane crops, there is a great difference of 
staple food supplies between the harvest season and the planting 
season while the demand is relatively constant [40]-[42]. During the 
harvests season, the market price is falling down because of the 
excess supply (surplus). Conversely, in the planting season, the 
market price will rise because of the excess demand when the 
customer wants more. Third, it may be cheaper to obtain the staple 
food from foreign country than domestic. This situation are caused 
by several reasons such as a low level of sugarcane productivity per 
hectare, a low level of sugar mill/plant efficiency, and the price 
distortion in the global market [43]-[46]. Fourth, it is probably 
speculative action of wholesaler encourage the price volatility [47]. 
 Due to some possibility causes of price volatility mentioned 
above, all stakeholders experience market risks [48], [49]. Producer 
is forced to sell staple food at lowest price during the harvest season. 
Consumer has to deal with the scarcity of staple food and the price 
hikes during the planting season. Non-speculative wholesaler 
suffers a larger procurement cost due to drop in selling quantity but 
raise in stocks. Government cannot maintain the food security to 
assure the availability of the staple food with enough amounts at the 
rational prices. The expectation of both the producer and the 
consumer is to obtain a reasonable price for their transaction with 
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the wholesaler. The non-speculative wholesaler expects all stocks 
can be sold with reasonable profit. The government keeps away the 
crisis of staple food. This case study requires a buffer stocks model 
to answer the expectation of all stakeholders. 
 As in the papers cited above, none of the models is appropriate to 
solve the case study by considering the four possibility reasons of 
high price volatility. Furthermore, Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) may be able to solve it because the problems above can be 
seen as an integration of key business processes from the integrated 
system point of views that include people (government, producer, 
wholesaler and consumer), material (staple food), equipment 
(distribution channel/infrastructure), and energy (financial and 
information). The integration of key business processes is required 
to achieve the suitable economic results and to leverage benefits 
[50]-[52]. In this work, a strategic level of Supply Chain (SC) design 
problem is addressed, that is the decision on buffer stocks for 
stabilizing good’s price. The buffer stocks schemes consist of 
planning, procurement, inventory, and operation program [53].  
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we propose the 
background of our research and describe the problems in real 
system. In Section 2, we construct the problem setting. In Section 3, 
we provide the methodology for solving the problem. In Section 4, 
we design the solution method and analysis. In Section 5, we deliver 
the summary and conclusion.  
2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
 In order to maintain the expectation of all stakeholders, the 
government can apply the buffer stocks schemes to sustain the 
market price on certain price band [54]. The relevant system of the 
problem is illustrated in Fig. 1. It consists of three main components 
namely single producer, single wholesaler, and single consumer as 
well as the government as regulator. The producer supplies the 
staple food to the market, and then the wholesaler distributes it to 
the customer. It is assumed that other products cannot substitute 
staple food. The total production is lower than the total 
consumption. Consequently, the import of staple food is permitted 
by the government to anticipate the market shortage. The 
government will use the buffer stocks schemes to intervene the 
market price when the market indicates a crisis. It is assumed that 
the price fluctuation as a single crisis indicator and the government 
has unlimited budgets. 
 
 
Figure 1. An overview of relevant system 
 In a free market (FM), the theory of supply and demand states 
the selling price for producer and the buying price for customer. In 
the harvest season, the producer sells the staple food to the 
wholesaler, and then the consumer buys it from the wholesaler as 
much as his/her demand. In the planting season, since the 
wholesaler still has excess inventory, then the consumer can buy it 
as much as his/her demand. To illustrate the market situation, the 
planning horizon of supply-demand is differentiated as four periods 
(Table 1.).  
Table 1. The market situation 
 
   
 In an interventioned market (IM), the market price is not only 
determined by supply-demand forces, but also by the buffer stocks 
schemes forces. The buffer stocks schemes can be used by the 
government to support/stabilize the market price for both the 
producer and the consumer. In the harvest season, especially during 
the boom periods (period t1-t2), the government intervenes the 
wholesaler to increase the purchasing price for the producer by 
applying the Price Support Program. The government purchases 
staple food to increase the market price up to PMin (minimum 
purchasing price permitted by regulator). On the other hand, 
throughout the planting season especially in the bush periods 
(t3-t4), the government asked the wholesaler to decrease the selling 
price for customer by using the Price Stabilization Program. The 
government sells the staple food in to the market to reduce the 
market price to PMax (maximum selling price permitted by 
regulator). 
 The price support and stabilization program above, or price band 
policies, are designed to keep the market price at a range of 
lower-upper price. A buffer stock model must be able to determine 
the instruments which are required for market intervention 
program. The objective of this model is not only to keep the 
expectation of both the producer and the consumer, but also to 
protect the non-speculative wholesaler from the undesirable result 
of the stabilization policy. The decisions concern on the quantity 
and the price of buffer stocks schemes to interfere both the 
purchasing price and the selling price. 
3 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION  
 The condition of staple food distribution and all relevant data 
(costs, supply-availability-demand, and other factors) were 
collected from the historical data and appropriate forecasting 
methods. The notations in the formulation will be described and all 
of the cost parameters and decision variables are measured in 
Indonesia Domestic Rupiah (IDR). 
Parameters:  
pc   Production cost of producer per unit (IDR/tons) 
dc   Distribution cost of wholesaler per unit (IDR/tons) 
oc   Operation cost of government (IDR/tons) 
hc  Holding cost (IDR/tons/year) 
ip   Staple food price in the global market (IDR/tons) 
ic   Import cost (IDR/tons) 
s
tq  Supplies of staple food in period t  (tons) 
d
tq  Demand of staple food in period t  (tons) 
A
tq  Amount of staple food in the market in period t  (tons) 
C
tq  Amount of consumption of staple food in period t  (tons) 
0p
tp  Purchasing price to producer in the FM in period t (IDR/tons) 
1p
tp  Purchasing price to producer in the IM period t (IDR/tons) 
0s
tp  Selling price to customer in the FM in period t (IDR/tons) 
1s
tp  Selling price to customer in the IM period t (IDR/tons) 
a   An asymptotic parameter of purchasing price function  
b   A natural logarithmic parameter of selling price function 
pCI  Crisis indicator of purchasing price for producer (IDR/tons) 
cCI   Crisis indicator of selling price for consumer (IDR/tons) 
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Major decision variables:  
MinP Minimum purchasing price limit (IDR/tons) 
MaxP Maximum selling price limit (IDR/tons) 
OPQ  Staple-food purchased by the government (tons)  
ORQ  Buffer stocks distributed by the government (tons)  
Minor decision variables:  
OIQ   Import quota (tons) 
OGQ  Amount of government buffer stocks (tons) 
PWQ  Amount of producer - wholesaler transaction (tons)  
WCQ  Amount of wholesaler - consumer transaction (tons)  
 
 A mathematical formulation is proposed in this work to 
incorporate the expectation of all stakeholders based on recourse 
model with three stages. First stage, an analysis of historical 
transaction is tackled to elaborate the wholesaler behavior and 
depict the price function. Second stage, the price band polices are 
made subject to the restrictions imposed by the first-stage results. 
Finally, a model formulation is conducted by using appropriate 
programming methods. 
3.1. Analysis of historical transaction  
 The historical data and appropriate analysis methods are used to 
depict the price function and the wholesaler behavior. An 
asymptotic curve is representing the historical data of the 
purchasing price function. Furthermore, the selling price function 
can be illustrated by a natural logarithmic curve. Based on the both 
price functions, the wholesaler behavior is differentiated in to two 
categories, speculative and non-speculative wholesaler. Speculator 
can push the market to be either a bull or a bear. It is reflected by the 
changes of the price functions at unreasonable rate. Hence, this 
study is only focus on the non-speculative wholesaler. Fig. 2 
describes both the purchasing price rate and the selling price rate 
versus the amount of supplies/consumption for the non-speculative 
wholesaler by utilizing the actual transaction data in the FM. 
 
Figure 2. Market price rate versus amount of 
supplies/consumption 
  
 As shown in Fig. 2, an analysis of historical transaction can be 
used to propose a proportional function either the purchasing or the 
selling price function. The functions are as follow: 
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3.2. Price band policies  
 The price functions in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) will be controlled by 
using the price band policies. When the amount of 
supplies/consumption is plentiful, actually both the producer and 
consumer experience the disadvantages transaction under the crisis 
indicator. Conversely, the non-speculative wholesaler is unsure to 
get a reasonable profit. The government can maintain the 
purchasing price at higher level than the crisis indicator by 
designing the price support program.   
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Furthermore, under Price Stabilization Program the government can 
control the selling price. 
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Generally, the price band policy is only created to give benefit for 
both the producer and the consumer. In this paper, the model 
formulation considers the expectation of the non-speculative 
wholesaler to sell goods with the reasonable profit. All of the 
transaction between the producer and the non-speculative 
wholesaler will be ensured to be sold out.  
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The minimum purchasing price and the maximum selling price 
which are permitted by regulator will be resolved in order to protect 
the non-speculative wholesaler from the undesirable result of the 
stabilization policy (Fig. 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Determination of price band policy  
3.3. Model formulation  
 Both the producer and the non-speculative wholesaler will get 
the reasonable profit when the market intervention had taken place. 
In contrast, both the customer and the government will spend money 
to buy the staple food and do the price intervention. For that reasons, 
the proposed-model will account the maximum benefit which could 
gain by the producer and the non-speculative wholesaler. All at 
once, it is also aimed to minimize the costs and the market risks for 
the customer and the government. 
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i) performance criterian for each stakeholders 
 The total profit for producer )( PTP  is obtained from the 
difference between the total revenue and the total production cost. 
The total revenue )( PTR  is expected from the amount of staple food 
bought by the government )( OPQ multiplied by the minimum 
purchasing price limit )( MinP  and the amount of staple food sold to 
wholesaler )( PWtQ multiplied by the current purchasing price )( 1ptp . 
The total production cost )( PTC is obtained by multiplying the 
production cost per unit )( pc and its production amount )( stq . 
Furthermore, the performance criteria for the producer can be 
expressed as: 
 
PPP TCTRTP                 (8) 
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 The non-speculative wholesaler will get the reasonable profit 
because the government will protect it from the undesirable result of 
the stabilization policy (Eq. 7). The total profit of non-speculative 
wholesaler )( WTP  is calculated from the difference between the 
total revenue and the total cost )( WTC  such as procurement cost, 
distribution cost, and inventory cost in the IM condition. The total 
revenue for non-speculative wholesaler )( WTR is computed by 
subtracting the total consumer’s demand with the amount of buffer 
stocks when the market-operation is conducted; then the total 
revenue is obtained by multiplying the selling-price )( 1stp with the 
total sales )( WCtQ . Total procurement cost )( PrW ocTC is obtained from 
sum of the staple food bought from the producer at the purchasing 
price. Total distribution cost )( WDistTC is measured from the 
multiplication of distribution cost per unit and the total consumer’s 
demand of staple food. Total inventory cost )( WInvtTC  is determined 
as the holding cost per unit in stock per unit of time multiplied by 
total of average inventory in a year. Therefore, the total profit for 
non-speculative wholesaler can be written as: 
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 In the IM condition, the consumer will spend money )( CTC to 
fulfill its total demand at the selling-price between the wholesaler 
and the consumer during period t1-t3. During period t4, the consumer 
bought the staple-food at the maximum price-limit when the 
market-operation is performed, and the rest of the demands will be 
purchased at the selling-price. Therefore, the total benefit for 
consumer is expressed as: 
 
MaxORs
t
t
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CTC 
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14
1
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 The Intervened Market Budget )(IMB  is obtained from the total 
cost )( GTC minus the total revenue )( GTR . The total cost consists of 
procurement cost, distribution cost, and inventory cost. The total 
revenue is gained from the multiplication between the amount of 
buffer stocks that is released to consumer and the maximum selling 
price limit. Total procurement cost )( PrWocTC  is calculated from the 
amount of staple food bought by the government from the producer 
at the minimum purchasing price limit and the amount of staple 
food bought by the government from import at its purchasing cost. 
Total distribution cost )( GDistTC  is computed by multiplying the cost 
of market operation by the government and the amount of buffer 
stocks that should be released to the market. Total inventory 
cost )( GInvtTC  is measured from the holding cost per unit in stock per 
unit of time multiplied by the total of government’s average 
inventory in a year. Therefore, the Intervened Market Budget for the 
government can be stated as follows:  
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ii) objective function  
 We develop a buffer stocks schemes for price stabilization to 
facilitate the expectation of stakeholders. The buffer stocks model 
therefore must attain two targets: maximize the benefit of the 
producer and the non-speculative wholesaler and minimize the total 
cost of consumer and government (Eq. 8-Eq. 11). The resulting 
objective function which includes the two objectives is finally 
expressed as follows:  
 
IMBTCTPPTPMax CW .  (12)  
 
iii)  constraint sets  
 Constraints (13), (14) and (15) are introduced to ensure that the 
price equilibrium fulfills the expectation of the producer and the 
non-speculative wholesaler at the price support program.  
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 Constraints (16), (17) and (18) are addressed to ensure that the 
price equilibrium fulfills the expectation of the consumer and the 
non-speculative wholesaler at the price stabilization program. 
 
fC eq 4  (16)  
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 We have to guarantee that the buffer stock schemes are not only 
adequate to hold the market-intervention program, but also to 
protect itself from the illegal import by considering constrains (19), 
(20) and (21). Finally, we have to make sure that none of the 
decision variables is negative by considering constraint (22).  
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4. SOLUTION METHOD AND ANALYSIS  
 In this section, we present the solution method, numerical 
examples and analysis to evaluate the expectation of stakeholders.  
4.1. Solution method  
The optimal solution can be obtained by solving the pre-emptive of 
the non-linear programming (NPL) above. The methodology to 
solve the proposed problem is described as follow:  
 forecast all the parameters from the historical data, 
 set the parameters of the market price function,  
 predict the market price in the FM, 
 formulate the objectives function in the IM,  
 formulate all the constraints of the solution model, and  
 solve the model by using NLP software i.e. Lingo v.9 [55]. 
4.2. Numerical examples and analysis  
 In order to illustrate the capabilities of the proposed-model, a 
numerical example has been done. The problem consists of 
hypothetic-parameters to reflect the data of Indonesian sugar 
market.  Let cp = 58, cd = 2.0, ch = 0.5, cO = 2.0, ci = 3.0, pi = 50; CIp 
= 1.1cp and CIc=1.38.cp in appropriate units. Thus, the 
supply-demand parameters are shown in Table 2. 
   Table 2. Parameter of supply-demand  
 t1 t2 t3 t4 Total 
d
tq  25 25 25 25 100 
s
tq  35 55 - - 90 
  
 We consider two sets of problem. It is indicating by two sets of 
price function parameter (a; b) i.e. set 1 (4950; 3.9) and set 2 (5000; 
4.0). The model was solved in Lingo software and the solutions are 
found by using the available methodology. The proposed-model 
estimates the decision variables in two set of price function 
parameter. Using the parameter assumptions outlined in Table 2, 
the proposed-model calculates both the decision variables (Table 3) 
and the performance criterian for each stakeholder (Table 4). 
 
   Table 3. A Computational of decision variables 
 (Unit) set 1 set 2 
MinP  IDR/tons 63.80 65.15 
MaxP  IDR/tons 79.69 81.44 
OPQ  tons 12.43 13.25 
ORQ  tons 22.41 23.25 
  
 Two sets of price band policies have been produced by the 
proposed-model. Price-band schemes can be suggested respectively 
between 63.80-79.69 and 65.15-81.44 per unit. The mechanism of 
increasing price band is explained by the wholesaler behavior. It can 
be noted that the increasing of price function parameter will 
influence the performance criteria for each stakeholder.  
 
   Table 4. A Computational of performance criteria  
 (Unit) set 1 set 2 
)( PTP  Mill. IDR 522.00 643.54 
)( CTC  Mill. IDR 1,146.16 1,163.66 
)( WTP  Mill. IDR 7,969.77 8,143.00 
)(IMB  Mill. IDR 1,368.38 1,441.71 
     
 
 Table 4 reports the results of the proposed-model regarding to the 
maximization of expected benefit for the producer and the 
non-speculative wholesaler; and the minimization of expected cost 
for the customer and the government. The market-intervention 
policy can be utilized to improve the profit for both the producer and 
the consumer. Therefore, the IMB is rising when the price function 
parameter is growing up.  
5. CONCLUSION  
 This paper studies a buffer stocks model for price stabilization in 
the staple food distribution system. This model is not only to keep 
the expectation of the producer and the consumer, but also to protect 
the non-speculative wholesaler from the undesirable result of price 
band policy. By considering both the purchasing price function and 
the selling price function, it is shown that model is able to decide the 
minimum purchasing price limit and the maximum selling price 
limit simultaneously. A nonlinear programming model was 
addressed to determine the instruments of intervention program. 
The instruments concern on the quantity and the price of buffer 
stocks schemes in order to intervene the market price. Moreover, 
the result shows that wholesaler behavior affects the intervention 
costs. 
 This paper has certain limitations that should be overcome in 
order to provide a deeper analysis on the function of a buffer stocks 
schemes. There are some extensions from this work that could be 
derived to elaborate the model formulation such as considering the 
budget constraint, providing a volatility target (VT) options, and 
offering the Intervened Market Budget (IMB) options. Furthermore, 
in this paper, it is assumed that the model is appropriate with the 
direct intervention system using by the State Trading Enterprises 
(STEs). In the future, it probably significant to develop a model that 
is suitable with the indirect intervention system for instance by 
using the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS). 
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